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Americans,	seeing	the	destruction	this	summer	from	floods	in	Pakistan,	 cannot	help	but	draw	comparisons	 to	 the	devastation	in	New	Orleans	during	Hurricane	Katrina.1	
Both	 raised	 serious	questions	 about	governmental	 response	 to	
natural	disasters,2	although	the	failings	of	both	governments	do	
not	permit	easy	comparisons.3	Despite	the	differences	between	
the	two,	Pakistan	can	learn	from	the	U.S.	response	to	Katrina:	that	
with	overcrowding	in	urban	areas4	and	limited	resources,	Pakistan	
will	likely	be	unable	to	overcome	the	geographic	challenges	of	
evacuation.	Instead,	Pakistan	must	rely	on	flood	prevention	tech-
niques,	primarily	in	its	cities,	as	its	central	line	of	defense.
Various	natural	and	human	causes	contributed	to	the	flooding	
in	Pakistan.	Two	leading	preventable	causes	were	deforestation	and	
waterway	planning.5	For	years,	the	“timber	mafia”	has	plundered	
Pakistan’s	forests,	reducing	the	country’s	tree	cover	from	14%	to	
5.2%	in	the	last	seventy-five	years.6	Pakistan’s	forests	provide	an	
essential	defense	against	floods	by	 trapping	water	and	breaking	
up	forceful	currents.7	Because	of	their	loss,	floodwaters	rose	with	
unprecedented	rapidity.8	Adding	to	the	catastrophe,	the	floodwaters	
swept	away	the	illegally	harvested	logs,	which	destroyed	bridges	
and	filled	the	dams	meant	to	defend	against	flooding.9	Illicit	loggers	
act	with	impunity	in	Pakistan	through	representation	in	the	govern-
ment	and	by	bribing	politicians.10	By	corrupting	elements	of	Paki-
stan’s	government,	the	“timber	mafia”	destroyed	Pakistan’s	most	
important	natural	defenses	against	flooding.
Pakistan’s	waterway	infrastructure	also	exacerbated	the	dam-
age	 from	 flooding.	 The	 waterway	 system	was	 built	 to	 benefit	
wealthy	landowners,	without	regard	for	environmental	impacts	or	
flood	prevention.11	After	the	floods,	Prime	Minister	Gilani	claimed	
that	a	proposed	dam	at	Kalabagh	would	have	averted	much	of	the	
devastation.12	But	his	belief	in	the	ability	of	large	dams	to	prevent	
flooding	 is	misplaced.13	The	Kalabagh	dam	project	 is	meant	 to	
take	pressure	off	the	weakening	Tarbela	dam.14	Like	the	Mangla	
and	Tarbela	dams,	Kalabagh’s	dual	objectives	are	hydro-electrical	
and	agricultural,	not	flood	control.15	Studies	show	that	the	Mangla	
and	Tarbela	dams	actually	increased	the	severity	of	flooding.16	The	
Taunsa	Barrage,	one	of	Pakistan’s	most	vulnerable	water	diversion	
mechanisms,	also	 increased	flooding	by	routing	water	 to	higher	
grounds	that	do	not	normally	flood.17	Many	worry	that	the	Kalabagh	
dam	will	simply	be	another	ticking	time	bomb	for	future	floods.18
Historically,	Pakistan’s	dams	are	 the	product	of	centralized	
decision-making	to	increase	agricultural	and	electrical	output,	with	
little	input	from	environmentalists	or	local	communities.19	Environ-
mental	organizations	have	criticized	Pakistan’s	water	system	engi-
neers	for	paying	insufficient	attention	to	the	environmental	effects	
of	large	dam	projects.20	One	such	effect,	sedimentation,	worsens	
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flooding	by	raising	riverbeds	and	minimizing	the	capacity	of	dams	
to	hold	water.21	By	ignoring	the	environmental	impacts	of	these	
large	projects	Pakistan’s	government	missed	an	opportunity	to	miti-
gate	the	flooding	and	instead	made	it	worse.22
Pakistan’s	flood	policy	failed	for	different	reasons	than	did	
the	U.S.	 government’s	 during	Hurricane	Katrina.	The	 levees	
failed	during	Katrina	because	the	U.S	Army	Corps	of	Engineers	
did	not	design	 them	 to	withstand	a	storm	surge	 from	a	Cate-
gory	5	hurricane,	and	because	all	levels	of	government	failed	to	
maintain	the	levees,	which	caused	them	to	leak	and	give	way.23	
The	decision	to	reduce	levee	maintenance	funding	in	the	months	
prior	to	Katrina	exemplifies	the	federal	government’s	failure.24	
But,	 despite	 the	overwhelming	 evidence	of	 government	mis-
management,	government	investigations	found	no	evidence	of	
corruption	or	class	favoritism	in	the	case	of	Katrina.25	Still,	Pak-
istan	can	learn	from	America’s	experience.
Even	 the	United	States,	with	all	 its	 resources	and	access	 to	
timely	 information,26	 could	 not	 effectively	 evacuate	masses	 of	
people.27	With	 its	 limited	 resources,28	 Pakistan	 cannot	 rely	 on	
evacuation.	The	current	flooding	in	Pakistan	left	ten	million	people	
displaced	and	submerged	twenty	percent	of	the	country.29	Pakistan	
spreads	across	more	than	300,000	miles,30	almost	ten	times	the	area	
of	New	Orleans,31	with	a	population	of	about	170	million,32	com-
pared	to	223,000	residents	in	New	Orleans.33	The	national	govern-
ment	is	weakened	by	constantly	bickering	provincial	authorities.34	
Most	of	Pakistan’s	population	lives	in	rural	areas	along	the	Indus	riv-
erbanks.35	However,	migration	caused	an	annual	urban	population	
growth	of	three	percent.36	Urban	decay,	overcrowding,	and	weak	
infrastructure	in	the	cities	create	vulnerable	pockets	of	dense	popula-
tion.37	These	factors	make	an	effective	evacuation	exceedingly	diffi-
cult,	and	the	shaky	Pakistani	government	risks	further	destabilization	
if	it	does	not	prepare	appropriately	for	the	next	flood.38
The	government	cannot	rely	on	evacuation	to	cope	with	future	
floods.	Instead,	Pakistan	must	look	to	flood	prevention.	The	cities	
must	be	Pakistan’s	central	focus,	as	the	weakened	rural	areas	will	
drive	more	people	to	the	cities.39	Nationally,	the	government	must	
legislate	to	conserve	the	remaining	forests,	and	invest	in	refores-
tation.40	It	must	adopt	a	cost–benefit	analysis	for	large	dam	con-
struction	that	accounts	for	flood	mitigation,	sedimentation,	and	
population	displacement.41	Finally,	the	international	community,	
speaking	 through	organizations	such	as	 the	World	Bank,	must	
fund	projects	that	further	flood	prevention.42
Endnotes:	A	Failure	of	Conscience	on page 70
Fall 2010 70
67	 	See	id. at	54.
68	 	See	id. at	56,	46.
69	 	See Jourdan,	Enhancing HOPE VI,	supra note	64,	at	9.
70	 	See id.
71	 	See id.
72	 	See id.
73	 	See id. at	9-11.
74	 	See id.
75	 	See id. at	9.
76	 	See id. at	9-10.
77	 	See id. at	11.
78	 	See id.
79	 	See id.
80	 	Jourdan,	Reducing Pre-Relocation Grief,	supra note	64,	at	63;	Jourdan,	
Enhancing HOPE VI,	supra note	64,	at	14.
81	 	Jourdan,	Enhancing HOPE VI,	supra note	64,	at	12-13.
82	 	Id. at	11.
83	 	Linda	D.	Elrod,	Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the “Right” 
Thing to Do, 27	pace l. rev.	869,	872	(2007).
84	 	Id.	at	875.
85	 	Id.
86	 	Id.
87	 	Id.
88	 	Finlay	v.	Finlay,	148	N.E.	624,	626	(N.Y.	1925).
89	 	Planned	Parenthood	of	Cent.	Mo.	v.	Danforth, 428	U.S.	52,	74	(1976).
90	 	See Barbara	Bennett	Woodhouse,	Children’s Rights,	in	hanDbook oF youth 
anD JuStice	377,	398-99	(Susan	O.	White	ed.,	2001)	(explaining	that	“the	idea	
that	children	must	be	provided	with	advocates	whose	role	is	to	represent	the	
child,	not	the	parent	or	the	state,	is	becoming	firmly	established”);	Elrod,	supra	
note	83,	at	912	(arguing	that	“a	child	who	has	the	capacity	to	direct	litigation	
should	be	able	to	do	so”).
91	 	Fla. Stat.	§	163.3167	(2010).
92	 	Fla. Stat.	§	163.3184	(2010).
93	 	Pinecrest	Lakes,	Inc.	v.	Shidel,	795	So.2d	191,	193	(Fla.	Dist.	Ct.	App.	
2001).
94	 	Id. at	207,	209.
95	 	See Warth	v.	Seldin,	422	U.S.	490,	497	(1975)	(explaining	that	“the	question	
of	standing	is	whether	the	litigant	is	entitled	to	have	the	court	decide	the	merits	
of	the	dispute	or	of	particular	issues”).
96	 	Endangered	Species	Act	of	1973,	16	U.S.C.	§§	1531-1544	(2006).
97	 	16	U.S.C.	§	1540	(g)(1).
98	 	Lujan	v.	Defenders	of	Wildlife,	504	U.S.	555	(1992).
99	 	Id.	at	560.
100		Id.	(quoting	Whitmore	v.	Arkansas,	495	U.S.	149,	155	(1990)).
101	 Id.
102		Id.	(citing	Allen	v.	Wright,	468	U.S.	737,	756	(1984);	quoting	Whitmore,	
495	U.S.	at	155	(1990)).
103		See Planned	Parenthood	of	Cent.	Mo.	v.	Danforth, 428	U.S.	52,	74	(1976).
104		Lujan,	504	U.S.	at	560 (quoting	Simon	v.	E.	Ky.	Welfare	Rights	Org.,	426	
U.S.	26,	41-42	(1976)).
105		Id.	at	561	(quoting	Simon,	426	U.S.	at	38).
106		Id.	at	562.
107		Id.	at	563-64.
108		Id.	at	564.
109		Raymond	A.	Just,	Intergenerational Standing Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act: Giving Back the Right to Biodiversity After Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife,	71	tul. l. rev.	597,	607	(1996).
110		Oposa	v.	Sec’y	of	the	Dep’t	of	Env’t	&	Natural	Res.,	33	I.L.M.	173	(1994).
111		Id.	at	185.
112		Id.	at	176-77.
113		Id.	at	176,	183.
114		Id.	at	177.
115		Id.	at	176.
116		Id.	at	185.
117		Id.
118		Id.	at	185-86.
119		Id.	at	198.
120		See	Dante	B.	Gatmaytan,	The Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa 
v. Factoran	as Pyrrhic Victory,	15	geo. int’l envtl. l. rev.	457,	467	(2003)	
(stating	that	the	plaintiffs	in	Oposa	dropped	their	suit	upon	the	Supreme	Court’s	
remand	of	their	case	to	the	trial	court,	and	that	commercial	timbering	contin-
ued).
121		See	Gregory	F.	Maggio,	Inter/intra-generational Equity: Current Applica-
tions under International Law for Promoting the Sustainable Development of 
Natural Resources,	4 buFF. envtl. l.J.	161,	192	(1997).
122		See id.	at	208-09,	214.
123		See Malgosia	Fitzmaurice,	The Right of the Child to a Clean Environment,	
23	S. ill. u. l.J.	611,	652	(1999)	(arguing	that	a	child’s	right	to	a	clean	envi-
ronment	ought	to	be	tied	to	a	child’s	right	to	achieve	environmental	justice).
1	 	See Cheree	Franco,	Can Pakistan Learn from Katrina?,	The ExpreSS	Tri-
bune	WorlD Blog,	http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/1258/can-pakistan-learn-
from-katrina/	(last	visited	Oct.	20,	2010).
2	 	See Snehal	Shingavi,	From Natural Disaster to Social Catastrophe,	Social-
iStworker (Aug.	16,	2010),	http://socialistworker.org/2010/08/16/disaster-to-
social-catastrophe	(noting	failures	of	Pakistan’s	infrastructure	and	actions	by	
government	officials	that	call	into	question	their	ability	to	protect	the	population	
during	floods);	U.S.	HouSe	oF RepreSentativeS,	a Failure oF initiative: Final 
report oF the Select bipartiSan committee to inveStigate the preparation 
For anD reSponSe to hurricane katrina,	h.r. rep. no.	109-377,	at	1-5	(2006)	
[hereinafter	houSe report]	http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/fullreport.
pdf	(discussing	the	failure	of	government	at	all	levels	to	prepare	and	respond	to	
Hurricane	Katrina).
3	 	See Shingavi, supra	note	2	(citing	Pakistan’s	dam	and	canal	system	built	to	
benefit	wealthy	landowners);	Peter	Bosshard	&	Shannon	Lawrence,	The World 
Bank’s Conflicted Corruption Fight,	international riverS (May	1,	2006),	
http://www.internationalrivers.org/south-asia/pakistan/world-bank’s-conflicted-
corruption-fight	(discussing	corruption	in	Pakistan’s	water	sector);	A Land 
Left to Drown by the ‘Timber Mafia’,	the heralD ScotlanD (Aug.	29,	2010),	
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/world-news/a-land-left-to-drown-by-the-
timber-mafia-1.1051230	(reporting	a	local	Pakistani	journalist’s	story	about	
government	collaboration	with	the	“timber	mafia”);	houSe report,	supra	note	
2,	at	359-62	(drawing	conclusions	about	the	failure	of	the	U.S.	federal,	state,	
and	local	government	to	appropriately	plan	for	Hurricane	Katrina).
4	 	See CIA World Fact Book: Pakistan,	cent. intelligence agency, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html	(last	visited	
Oct.	23,	2010)	(providing	statistical	data	about	urban	population	growth	from	
2005	to	2010).
5	 	See Medha	Bisht,	Pakistan Floods: Causes and Consequences,	InSt.	For	
DeFence	StuDieS	anD	AnalySeS (Aug.	19,	2010),	http://www.idsa.in/idsacom-
ments/PakistanFloodsCausesandConsequences_mbisht_190810	(asserting	
that	a	variety	of	natural	and	man-made	causes	led	to	the	flooding	in	Pakistan);	
Shingavi,	supra note	2	(noting	the	failure	of	Pakistan’s	waterway	system	to	
adequately	protect	against	flooding);	Alex	Rodriguez,	Pakistan Flood Crisis 
Blamed Partly on Deforestation,	L.a. timeS (oct.	13,	2010),	http://articles.lat-
imes.com/2010/oct/13/world/la-fg-pakistan-logging-20101013	(noting	the	role	
of	deforestation	in	exacerbating	the	flooding).
6	 	See peter giZewSki & thomaS homer-Dixon, environmental Scarcity 
anD violent conFlict: the caSe oF pakiStan,	pt.	2	(Apr.	1996),	http://www.
library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/pakistan/pak2.htm	(noting	that	the	Pakistani	gov-
ernment	and	the	“timber	mafia”	have	exploited	the	forests	and	caused	heavy	
deforestation	that	eliminates	much	of	the	tree	cover	in	the	country).	Several	
other	articles	published	after	the	floods	provide	statistics	of	deforestation	and	
the	role	of	the	“timber	mafia”	from	different	regions	and	provinces	around	
Pakistan.	See also	Bisht, supra note	5;	Rodriguez,	supra note	5;	A Land Left to 
Drown,	supra note	3;	Amir	Mohammad	Khan, ‘Timber Mafia’ Made Floods 
Worse	(Aug.	17,	2010,	8:12	PM),	http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/floodofmis-
ery/2010/08/201081614111704604.html;	Pakistan Floods and the Timber 
Mafia,	UniteD	PreSS	Int’l (Sep.	2,	2010,	2:56	PM),	http://www.upi.com/Sci-
ence_News/Resource-Wars/2010/09/02/Pakistan-flods-and-the-timber-mafia/
UPI-92421283453799.
7	 	See Khan, supra note	6	(quoting	the	head	of	Pakistan’s	Forest	Institute	that	
forests	play	an	important	role	in	mitigating	the	force	of	floods).
8	 	Id.	(discussing	the	role	of	“inadequate	forest	cover”	that	allowed	the	flood	
endnoTes: a Failure oF conScience: how pakiStan'S DevaStating FlooDS compare to america'S experience 
  During katrina continued from page 46
SuStainable Development law & policy71
waters	to	rise	quickly);	Id.	(noting	that	Shakil	Quadir,	the	provincial	head	of	the	
National	Disaster	Management	Authority	(“NDMA”),	estimates	that	if	Pakistan	
had	preserved	twenty	to	twenty-five	percent	of	its	original	tree	cover,	the	flood-
ing	would	have	been	greatly	mitigated).
9	 	See	Bisht,	supra note	5	(noting	that	timber	stored	away	for	transportation	
was	washed	away	in	the	flood,	destroying	bridges	and	dams);	see also Khan,	
supra note	6.
10	 	See	A Land Left to Drown,	supra note	3	(noting	that	the	“timber	mafia”	has	
representatives	in	Pakistan’s	government	and	connections	with	the	military);	
giZewSki,	supra note	6	(providing	a	brief	history	of	the	development	of	“timber	
mafia”	entrenchment	in	the	government).
11	 	See peter giZewSki & thomaS homer-Dixon, environmental Scarcity anD 
violent conFlict: the caSe oF pakiStan,	pt.	1	(Apr.	1996),	http://www.library.
utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/pakistan/pak1.htm	(discussing	the	construction	of	large	
dams	and	other	“mega	projects”	without	consideration	for	the	social	impacts);	
Shaheen	RaFi Khan,	the kalabagh controverSy,	at	8-10,	http://www.sanal-
ist.org/Acrobat/A-14.pdf	(last	visited	Oct.	20,	2010)	(highlighting	the	adverse	
environmental	affects	of	large	dams	built	in	Pakistan);	Shingavi,	supra note	
2	(asserting	the	general	claim	that	Pakistan’s	waterway	infrastructure	benefits	
only	wealthy	landowners);	Bosshard	&	Lawrence, supra note	3	(noting	the	
ways	in	which	Pakistan’s	waterway	infrastructure	has	supported	wealthy	elites	
and	landowners).
12	 	See Kalabagh Dam Could Have Averted Destruction of Floods: PM 
Gilani,	paktribune (Aug.	10,	2010),	http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.
shtml?230425	(directly	quoting	Prime	Minister	Gilani’s	statement	regarding	the	
devastation	caused	by	the	flooding).
13	 	See khan,	supra note	11,	at	8	(asserting	that	large	dams	provide	little	as	a	
flood	prevention	mechanism).
14	 	See id.	at	1	(discussing	the	controversy	of	the	Kalabagh	dam	as	a	replace-
ment	for	the	Tarbela	dam).
15	 	Khan’s	study	of	the	Kalabagh	dam	project	indicates	that	supporters	of	the	
dam	are	largely	in	favor	of	the	project	for	its	increase	in	agricultural	and	hydro-
electrical	output.	Yet,	as	Khan	shows,	there	is	sufficient	evidence	to	prove	that	
the	environmental	impacts	of	the	dam	will	mirror	the	negative	impacts	of	past	
large	dams	on	the	Indus	river	valley	ecosystem.	See id. at	8-10.
16	 	The	Mangla	and	Tarbela	Dams	were	completed	in	1967	and	1974	respec-
tively.	Table	4	of	Dr.	Khan’s	study	provides	figures	that	show	no	reduction	in	
the	lives	lost,	villages	affected,	or	area	affected	by	floods	since	the	construction	
of	the	dams.	If	these	large	dams	were	built	to	prevent	flood	damage	(which	they	
were	not)	then	presumably	there	would	be	a	reduction	in	lives	lost	and	villages	
affected.	See id.	at	tbl.	4.
17	 	See Mushtaq	Gaadi,	Understanding the Flood Disaster at Taunsa Barrage,	
int’l riverS (Aug.	20,	2010),	http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/5723	
(describing	the	causes	that	led	to	flooding	at	the	Taunsa	Barrage,	a	key	failure	
in	Pakistan’s	waterway	system	that	contributed	to	the	devastation).
18	 See id.	(expressing	a	general	concern	about	the	use	of	reasoning	by	engineers	
to	justify	the	construction	of	the	Kalabagh	dam);	see also	khan,	supra note	11,	
at	6-9	(providing	evidence	as	to	the	ecological	harm	and	concerns	of	sedimenta-
tion	that	would	occur	from	construction	of	the	Kalabagh	dam).
19	 	See	khan,	supra note	11,	at	1,	8	(highlighting	the	selective	use	of	data	by	
the	Pakistani	government,	and	a	historical	system	of	centralized	decision	mak-
ing	that	ignores	the	concerns	of	local	communities).
20	  See peter giZewSki & thomaS homer-Dixon, environmental Scarcity anD 
violent conFlict: the caSe oF pakiStan, pt.	3	(Apr.	1996),	http://www.library.
utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/pakistan/pak3.htm	(noting	that	planners	of	large	dams	have	
consistently	neglected	the	impacts	on	groundwater,	local	water	quality,	etc.).
21	 	See Gaadi, supra note	17	(citing	the	impact	of	sedimentation,	specifically	at	
the	Taunsa	Barrage,	which	led	to	the	flooding	of	higher	grounds).
22	 	See id.	(using	the	Taunsa	Barrage	as	an	example	of	the	larger	effect	that	
large	dam	projects	had	in	exacerbating	the	flooding).
23	 	houSe report,	supra	note	2,	at	87-97	(discussing	the	role	of	the	U.S.	Army	
Corp	of	Engineers	in	failing	to	design	the	levees	with	the	ability	to	withstand	a	
Category	5	hurricane,	and	the	continued	operation	of	the	levees	with	the	knowl-
edge	that	they	would	not	withstand	such	a	hurricane.	Also,	discussing	the	fail-
ure	of	federal,	state,	and	local	government	to	appropriately	maintain	the	levees,	
which	led	to	leaking	even	prior	to	Hurricane	Katrina).
24	 	See Will	Bunch,	Why the Levee Broke, alternet (Sept.	1,	2005),	http://
www.alternet.org/story/24871/?page=entire	(discussing	several	instances	where	
people	in	charge	of	maintaining	the	levees	reported	a	lack	of	funding	from	the	
federal	government	to	complete	the	maintenance	projects).
25	 	Nothing	in	the	U.S.	House	Report	indicates	that	class	favoritism	or	govern-
ment	corruption	played	a	role	in	the	government	failures	to	prepare	and	respond	
to	Katrina.	See	houSe report, supra note	2.
26	 	See id.	at	1	(noting	that	the	U.S.	government	is	the	world’s	largest	purchaser	
of	intelligence	and	information,	and	it	could	still	not	respond	quickly	enough	to	
Hurricane	Katrina).
27	 See id. at	103-04,	108-23	(discussing	the	failure	of	local	officials	to	evacuate	
a	larger	portion	of	the	population	in	a	timely	manner	from	New	Orleans	and	
Jefferson	Parish	despite	the	successful	evacuations	in	Mississippi,	Alabama,	
and	other	affected	parts	of	Louisiana).
28	 	See	giZewSki, pt.	1,	supra note	11	(highlighting	the	economic,	geographic,	
and	demographic	diversity	of	Pakistan);	CIA World Fact Book: Pakistan,	supra 
note	4	(noting	that	Pakistan	only	has	about	125,000	miles	of	paved	roads	and	
about	3,500	miles	of	railways	ranking	20th	and	28th	respectively	in	the	world).
29	 See Michael	Georgy,	Pakistan Floods Cost $9.7 Bln in Damage: ADB/
WBank,	ReuterS (Oct.	14,	2010	12:19	PM),	http://news.yahoo.com/s/
nm/20101014/pl_nm/us_pakistan_floods_damage_2/print	(providing	recent	
statistics	about	the	floods	in	Pakistan);	Pakistan Floods and the Timber Mafia,	
supra note	5	(noting	that	the	floods	submerged	about	twenty	percent	of	Pakistan).
30	 See CIA World Fact Book: Pakistan,	supra note	4	(providing	data	about	
Pakistan’s	size).
31	 See State and County Quickfacts: New Orleans (city),	u.S. cenSuS bureau, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/2255000.html	(last	visited	Oct.	23,	2010).
32	 See population cenSuS organiZation, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/	
(last	visited	Oct.	23,	2010).
33	 See State and County Quickfacts: New Orleans (city), supra	note	31.
34	 See giZewSki, pt.	1,	supra note	11	(discussing	the	consistent	battle	over	
resources	between	provinces).
35	 See id.	(describing	geographic	distribution	of	the	population,	and	noting	that	
most	of	the	population	is	rural	and	lives	along	riverbanks).
36	 	See CIA World Facts Book: Pakistan,	supra note	4	(providing	statistical	data	
regarding	urban	population	growth	between	2005-2010);	GiZewSki,	pt.	3,	supra 
note	20	(highlighting	the	effects	of	population	growth	on	urban	decay).
37	 	See giZewSki, pt.	3,	supra note	20	(noting	the	adverse	effects	of	the	urban	
population	boom	on	the	structure	of	Pakistani	cities).
38	 See Bisht,	supra note	5	(noting	the	fragile	relationship	between	the	general	
population	and	the	government,	and	recognizing	that	a	lack	of	response	by	the	
government	could	elevate	the	anger	of	the	people).
39	 	Gizewski	and	Homer-Dixon	note	that	Pakistani’s	are	already	swarming	to	
the	cities	where	there	is	comparatively	more	prosperity	than	in	rural	areas.	The	
flooding	destroyed	much	of	Pakistan’s	ability	to	produce	crops.	It	is	likely	that	
more	people	will	flood	to	the	cities,	where	shelter,	food,	services,	and	opportu-
nity	are	more	likely	than	in	the	isolated	rural	areas.	See giZewSki, pt.	3,	supra 
note	20.
40	 See	khan,	supra	note	6	(quoting	the	NDMA	regional	director	about	securing	
lands	that	were	affected	by	the	floods	because	of	deforestation).
41	 See khan,	supra note	11,	at	8	(discussing	the	new	approach	to	large	dam	
projects).
42	 See Bosshard	&	Lawrence,	supra note	3	(providing	historical	data	about	the	
World	Bank’s	investment	in	Pakistani	waterway	infrastructure).
21	 	Id.
22	 	Id.
23	 	Sheela	Patel,	Sundar	Burra	&	Celine	D’Cruz,	Slum/Shack Dwellers Interna-
tional–Foundations to Treetops,	13:1	env’t & urbaniZation 45	(2001),	avail-
able at	http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd26/enurb/v13n2/45.pdf.
24	 	Sheela	Patel,	Celine	d’Cruz	&	Sundar	Burra,	Beyond Evictions in a Global 
City: People Managed Resettlement in Mumbai,	14	env’t & urbaniZation 
159, 163	(2002),	available at	http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/drivers_urb_
change/urb_infrastructure/pdf_city_planning/IIED_patel_Evictions.pdf.
25	 	Celine	d’Cruz	&	David	Satterthwaite,	The Role of Urban Grassroots Orga-
nizations and Their National Federations in Reducing Poverty and Achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals,	global urban Dev. Mar.	2006,	at	1,	http://www.
endnoTes: out oF the garDen oF eDen: moving beyonD the rightS-baSeD agenDa in the urban Sector
  continued from page 49
